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COMMENT
Beyond the Box Score: A Look at
Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Professional Sports and Their Effect
on Competition
I. INTRODUCTION
Most sports fans have at least the limited understanding that collective bar-
gaining agreements govern the employer-employee relationships between the
owners of professional sports teams and players' associations. Indeed, sports have
become a big business in the United States, and the media coverage of sports has
extended beyond reporting statistics and scores to include all dealings associated
with the business.' Every year (at various times depending on the sport), fans are
bombarded with numbers detailing signing bonuses, salary cap implications, arbi-
tration results, incentive-laden contracts, and a multitude of other terms that bog-
gle the mind of the layperson. As most sports fans (and reporters) take a what-
have-you-done-for-me-lately attitude toward the performance of their teams and
the organizations that assemble them, little attention has been paid to the historical
progression that has led to the current state of professional sports. A historical
analysis is critical to understanding why Major League Baseball, the National
Basketball Association, and the National Football League2 each have separate
agreements governing their leagues. Such an examination helps to explain why
the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) exist in their current structure. The
articles of the various CBAs govern the professional sports players' compensa-
tion, the procedures for settling disputes, and address a myriad of other issues
relating to the employer-employee relationship in sports.3 This comment will
examine the history of the three most prominent leagues in U.S. professional
sports, the CBAs that govern the employer-employee relationship in each league,
the provisions of those CBAs that influence player contracts and contract disputes,
the perceptions about competition that have resulted from CBA governance of the
leagues, and possible solutions to problems that exist within those leagues.
1. See e.g., SportsBusiness Journal,
http://www.sportsbusinessjoumal.com/index.cfmfuseaction=page.feature&featureld=43 (last visited
Mar. 3, 2008).
2. These are the current "Big Three" of U.S. professional sports. My apologies to the NHL, which
has had a substantial decline in popularity since the 2004 lockout.
3. See generally, 2005 NBA/NBPA CBA, available at http://www.nbpa.conmcba.php.
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II. MLB: THEN & Now
Baseball has been played in America since the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, though it was not played professionally until 1868.4 In 1871, twenty-five
professional clubs formed the National Association of Baseball Clubs, which
would later become the National League.5 The American League, lagging behind
slightly, was formed in 1900.6 Players switched teams incessantly during the
baseball's infancy. 7 Contracts lasted only for a year, after which time the players
were able to offer their services out on the open market.8 This process of exclu-
sively playing one-year contracts would soon prove to be short-lived. Shortly
after organized professional play began, baseball "sought to establish a policy of
self-governance in all matters," including player contracts and salary disputes. 9
This power, once established, allowed owners to be inconsiderate in compensating
their players, which often led to labor disputes. I0 In 1879, these disputes led to the
inception of baseball's reserve system." The reserve system was first a secret
"gentleman's agreement" among owners that provided a list of five players on
each team to be protected and reserved for the owner of each team.1 2 The other
owners acknowledged this system by agreeing not to sign protected players away
from their current team.13 This "gentleman's agreement" proved very successful,
and by the late 1880s the owners included a reserve clause in every player con-
tract.' 4 The clause gave the owners the option to continue renewin each player's
contract indefinitely at a salary chosen at the owner's discretion.' If the player
refused to sign the new contract, he was left with two options: (1) continue to
play for the current team, or (2) permanently retire from baseball.16 This new
system was a substantial departure from the early days of professional baseball,
which more closely resembled "the early forerunner to today's free agency."'
' 7
The reserve system, as well as the owners' practice of trading players for cash
at will, led to even greater player discord. 18 Thus, by 1885, player John Mont-
gomery Ward helped to organize the Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Play-
ers.' 9 Although the Brotherhood attracted many of the great players of its day, its
attempt at self-help failed as the Brotherhood "lost money and many of its star
4. Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional Baseball, I SPORTS
LAWJ. 183 (1994).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 184.
7. Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS LAW
J. 221, 223 (1998).
8. Id.
9. Thomas J. Hopkins, Arbitration: A Major League Effect on Players' Salaries, 2 SErON HALL J.





14. Id. at 303-04.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Conti, supra note 7, at 223.
18. Hopkins, supra note 9, at 304. Owner abuses included the suspension of a sick player (forcing
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players were lured back by the owners' promises of steady pay and steady
work."20 As a result, in December of 1890, the Brotherhood folded after just one
season. 21 The players next sought relief from the courts, and in 1922, challenged
the reserve clause on the grounds that the League had conspired to monopolize the
baseball business.22 The players' case went to the U.S. Supreme Court. However,
the Court ruled for the league, stating that the reserve clause did not violate anti-
23trust laws because baseball was not engaged in interstate commerce. The court
reasoned that "'[the business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely
state affairs."' 24 Therefore, the transportation of persons across state lines was
25considered an insignificant interference with interstate commerce. In 1953,the
league's reserve system was again challenged in Toolson v. New York Yankees,
26
with the players now using the advent of interstate baseball broadcasts to bolster
their antitrust claim.2 7 But, once again, the Supreme Court upheld the reserve
clause, noting that invalidation of the reserve system would cause the end of com-
petitive baseball, and thus death to the sport.28 In 1972, the Supreme Court again
heard a challenge to the reserve system in Flood v. Kuhn.29 In Flood, "[a player]
challenge[d] the reserve clause on the basis that it violated antitrust laws after he
was refused the right to negotiate a new contract with another club., 30 The court
again sided with the owners, upholding the antitrust exemption, stating that "the




In 1966, the players, led by United Steelworkers of America economist Mar-
vin Miller, formed the Major League Baseball Player's Association (MLBPA).32
In 1968, the MLBPA and baseball owners negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement, Major League Baseball's First Basic Agreement.33 The agreement
established a minimum salary and a grievance procedure for settling disputes whe-
reby the Commissioner, a osition chosen by the owners, would be the ultimate
arbitrator of any grievance. Two years later, the Second Basic Agreement raised
the minimum salary from ten to fifteen thousand dollars and changed the griev-
ance procedure to one where a panel of arbitrators outside the Commissioner's
office could be chosen to handle disputes. 35 This change in procedure would mark
the first time in the history of the league that the owner's would not have total
20. Id. at 305.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209
(1922)).
24. Id. (quoting Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 208).
25. Id.
26. 346 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1953).
27. Hopkins, supra note 9, at 305-06 (citing Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356-57 (1953)).
28. Id.
29. 407 U.S. 258, 258 (1972).
30. Hopkins, supra note 9, at 306.
31. Id. (citing Flood, 407 U.S. at 272-73).
32. Major League Baseball Players Association: MLBPA History,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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control over player disputes. 36 The next major change occurred five years later
with the 1973 Basic Agreement, which granted the players the ten and five rule.
37
This rule allowed players with ten years of major league experience and five Z8ears
with his current team both the right to refuse a trade and salary arbitration. In
1975, the reserve system was finally eliminated as arbitrator Peter Seitz declared
that the reserve clause in a player's contract would apply only for that contract,
and therefore ended clubs' use of the option clause as perpetual right to renew.
39
As a result of this ruling, the 1976 Basic Agreement allowed players with six
years in the major leagues to qualify for a limited form of free agency, whereby
those players would participate in a re-entry draft that would allow teams to bid
for free agents in reverse order of finish to encourage competitive balance.' This
provision was later eliminated to allow players qualifying for free agency to be
available to the highest bidder.41 Salary arbitration was available to those players
ineligible for free agency who had at least two years of major league experience.4 2
Free agency and salary arbitration have had a major effect on player salaries.43
One year after salary arbitration was initiated in 1975 the average player salary
was $44,676. 44 In 2005, the average player salary was $2,632,655.5
Despite this rapid increase in player salaries, the MLB does not have a salary
cap. 46 The MLB owners' last attempt to enact a salary cap in 1994 failed misera-
bly.4 7 During this year, the CBA was scheduled to be renegotiated, but serious
new issues in the professional baseball arena threatened the success of this rene-
gotiation.48 The most important issue confronting the owners was a glaring dis-
parity in television revenue between larger and smaller market teams.49 Local,
unshared television revenues for large market clubs were becoming increasingly
profitable, to the point that the increased wealth allowed those clubs to sign many
more high-priced (and presumably better) free-agent players than their small mar-
ket counterparts. 50 The small-market teams were demanding that the large-market
teams share their television revenues, and were prepared to vote down any new
CBA that did not include such a provision.51 The large-market teams would only
agree to such a revenue-sharing arrangement if the new CBA included a salary
cap, so that their lost television profits could be recouped in the form of reduced
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 335 n.50.





44. Major League Baseball Salaries by Baseball Almanac, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/charts/salary/major__leaguesalaries.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
45. Id.
46. See 2007-2011 MLB Basic Agreement, available at
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2008) [hereinafter MLB
CBA].
47. Daniel C. Glazer, Can't Anybody Here Run This Game? The Past, Present, and Future of Major
League Baseball, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 339, 363 (1999).
48. Id. at 362-63.
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labor costs.5 2 The players rejected the proposed salary cap offer, ultimately result-
ing in a players' strike that lasted over two-hundred days, and the unprecedented
canceling of baseball's postseason, including the World Series. 53 While the strike
lasted through most of spring training of the following season, the strike ended
shortly before the first games of the 1995 season, when the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) agreed to seek an injunction against the owners, which al-
lowed for the 1995 and 1996 seasons to be played under the old CBA.54
In 1996, the owners and players finally reached an agreement.5 5 The ap-
proved new CBA, which came into effect in 1997, included some interesting
changes. First, the agreement included a "competitive balance" or "luxury tax"
that called for the teams with the five highest payrolls to pay a 35% tax on payroll
spending over a set threshold amount, thus hopefully discouraging high player
salaries. 56  Additionally, the owners implemented a revenue-sharing plan that
would transfer revenue from the thirteen wealthiest clubs to the rest of the fran-
chises by the year 2000. 57 Salary arbitration remained largely unchanged, with the
exception that the number of arbitrators was increased from one to three in order
to reduce the number of "aberrant" decisions.58 Finally, the owners and players
agreed to jointly petition Congress to eliminate MLB's anti-trust exemption as it
pertained to labor matters.
59
The current MLB CBA, which has been in effect since 2003, 60 maintains
many of the provisions that were negotiated into the 1997 agreement. Major
League clubs may have title to and reserve up to a maximum of forty player con-
tracts. 61 These contract rights are maintained by the club until a player becomes a
free agent or his contract is assigned. A player can achieve free agency if he has
(1) fulfilled his current contract; (2) completed at least six years of ma or league
service; and (3) not executed a contract for the next succeeding season. There is
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 364.
55. Id.
56. Id. The money collected under the luxury tax is as follows: The first $5 million is held in re-
serve in the event a team should earn a tax refund during that year. The remaining balance is contri-
buted to the Industry Growth Fund (IDF) used to help expand the baseball industry generally. Fifty
percent of the proceeds over that amount go to player benefits. Twenty-five percent of those remain-
ing proceeds go to fund high school and other projects where baseball is not played, and the last twen-
ty-five percent goes back to the IDF. See 2007-2011 MLB Basic Agreement art. XXIU, § H, available
at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
57. Glazer, supra note 47 at 365.
58. Id.
59. Id. Congress finally acquiesced by passing the Curt Flood Act in 1998. Id. at 365 n. 166.
60. It is important to note here that a new MLB CBA was recently negotiated and will be in effect
through 2011. While some minor changes were made from the 2003 agreement, most of that agree-
ment incorporated into the new one. Changes of note include increasing the luxury tax by $40 million,
eliminating deadlines for free agents to sign with their former teams, elimination of the ability of a
player who was traded in the middle of a multi-year contract to demand a trade, and the ability of
teams who are unable to sign their first-round amateur draft choices to be compensated with compara-
ble choices in the subsequent year's draft. See Barry M. Bloom, MLB, Union Announce New Labor
Deal, MLB.com, Oct. 25, 2006,
http://inlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20061024&contentid= 1722211 &vkey=ps2006news&fext=
.jsp&cid=mlb.
61. MLB CBA art. XX, § A.
62. Id. art. XX, § B(l).
No. 11
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a fifteen-day election period, beginning on the latter of October 15 or the day
following the last game of the World Series, for a player choosing to pursue free-
agency to give notice of his intentions to the Player's Association.61 After free
agency notice has been given to the Association, the player is available to meet
with any team to discuss the possibility of signing a contract. 64 Once the free
agency election period has expired, the player can then negotiate and contract with
any team he chooses. 65 However, if the player has not contracted with another
team prior to December 1 of that year, the former club of that player has the right
to proceed to salary arbitration and retain the player for the upcoming season.66 If
the player does sign a contract with a new club following the election period, the
player's former club is entitled to compensation in the form of amateur draft
picks.67
There is no maximum player salary or salary cap, though there are established
minimum player salaries as well as a unique system for arbitration. Salary arbitra-
tion, without the consent of the other party, is available to any club or any player
68
with three to six years of service in MLB. Additionally, a player with two to
three years of service is eligible for arbitration if he has accumulated at least eigh-
ty-six days of service during the immediately preceding season and ranks in the
top 17% in total service in that class of players that have two to three years of
service with at least eighty-six days of service in the preceding season.69 The
arbitration process is as follows: After the player or club has submitted notice of
the intent to pursue arbitration, the player and club exchange the figures that each
side will submit for arbitration. 70 If the club submits the matter to arbitration, the
player has seven days after receipt of the club's proposed figure to withdraw from
arbitration (and thus continue performance at the rate contracted).71 Submissions
to arbitration are made between January 5 and January 15 of each year, and the
hearings are held between February 1 and February 20.72 The arbitration hearings
are typically held before a three-person panel. 73 The arbitrators are selected an-
nually by the MLB Player's Association and the MLB Labor Relations Depart-
ment ("LRD"), and these two groups designate one arbitrator to serve as the panel
chair.74 The procedure of the actual hearings is unique. The player and club each
submit a salary figure, along with a contract for the player's services that is com-
63. Id. art. XX, § B(2)(a).
64. Id. art. XX, §§ B(2)(a) & (b).
65. Id. art. XX, § B(2)(c).
66. Id. art. XX, § B(3).
67. Id. art. XX, § B(4)(a).
68. Id. art. VL § F(l).
69. Id. art. VI, § F(l).
70. Id. art. VL § F(3). The clubs are bound by special exceptions from maximum salary reduction
rules in the CBA that provide that the club must submit a salary figure for arbitration that is at least
80% of the player's previous year salary and earned performance bonuses (or at least 70% of his salary
and earned performance bonuses for the previous two years), unless that player received an increase of
at least 50% of his previous year's salary in an arbitration proceeding in the immediately preceding
year. Id.
71. Id. art. VL § F(4).
72. Id. art. VI, § F(5).
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plete except for the blank that would normally include the player's salary. 75 "The
hearings [are] conducted on a private and confidential basis. 76 Each of the par-
ties to the case is permitted just "one hour for initial presentation and one-half
hour for rebuttal and summation., 7 7 The arbitration panel is allowed to consider
as criteria for its decision "[1] the quality of the Player's contribution to his Club
during the past season... [2] the length and consistency of his career contribu-
tion, [3] the record of the Player's past compensation, [4] comparative baseball
salaries ... [5] the existence of any physical or mental defects on the part of the
Player, and [6] the recent performance record of the Club including but not limited
to its League standing and attendance as an indication of public acceptance .... 78
The arbitrators may not consider as criteria "(i) The financial position of the Play-
er and the Club [including the competitive balance tax consequences]; (ii) Press
comments, testimonials or similar material bearing on the performance of either
the Player or the Club... (iii) Offers made by either the Player or the Club prior
to arbitration; (iv) The cost to the parties of their representatives ... [or] (v.) Sala-
ries of other sports or occupations., 79 After considering the allowed relevant cri-
teria for determining the player's value, the arbitration panel renders a decision,
awarding either the player's or the club's submission within twenty-four hours.
80
The arbitration award is an either/or proposition, thus the process is sometimes
termed "final offer" arbitration. 81 One submission or the other must be chosen,
and the decision is reached without issuance of an opinion.82 The Players' Asso-
ciation and the LRD are initially informed only of the award and not how the pan-
el members voted.83
MLB also uses arbitration in its procedure for settling "grievances. " 84 A
grievance within the CBA is defined as "a complaint which involves the existence
or interpretation of, or compliance with, any agreement, or any provision of any
agreement, between the [Players'] Association and the Clubs or any of them, or
between a Player and a Club. 8 5 This procedure requires a player to file a written
notice of a grievance to his club's designated representative no later than forty-
five days after the facts of the matter became known. 86 Within ten days of the
player's notice, the club's representative makes a decision on the matter and then
furnishes that decision in writing to the Players' Association. 87 The representa-
tive's decision is then considered final, unless the player appeals the decision
75. Id. art. VI, § F(6).
76. Id. art. VI, §F(9).
77. Id.
78. Id. art. VI, § F(12)(a).
79. Id. art. VI, § F(12)(b).




84. Id. art. XI.
85. Id. art. XI, § A(l)(a). The definition of a grievance is pretty well comprehensive of any dispute
that might occur, although it does list complaints regarding the players' benefit plan and dues as ex-
empt from this procedure, as well as actions taken with respect to a player by the commissioner involv-
ing "the integrity of the game." Id.
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within fifteen days.88 If the player elects to appeal, the Association and a desig-
nated representative of the LRD discuss the grievance, after which the LRD repre-
sentative issues an opinion to the Association. 89 Once again, if the player does not
appeal this decision within fifteen days, the matter is considered settled.90 How-
ever, if the player appeals this decision, either the player or the association may
appeal to the Panel Chairman for impartial arbitration.9 1 Upon receipt of notice
for appeal, the Panel Chairman will set a time and date for a hearing, not to be
more than twenty days from the receipt of notice.92 The hearings are then heard
by an arbitration panel and conducted in accordance with Rules of Procedure set
out in the CBA. 9 3 The hearings are informal, and begin by first allowing the in-
itiating party to present its case, and then allowing all interested parties the oppor-
tunity to be heard.94 Legal rules of evidence do not apply to the proceedings, so
that all evidence desired to be offered by the parties is allowed, and the Panel
Chairman judges its relevancy and materiality. 95 Additionally, the Panel Chair-
man may request that the parties produce additional evidence that the chairman
96deems necessary to understanding and adjudicating the dispute. Following a
determination by the panel, two copies of the written decision are given to each
party.97 The panel's decision is considered the full and final disposition of the
matter.
98
III. NBA: THEN & Now
The National Basketball Association (NBA) was founded in 1949, when the
remaining six teams in the National Basketball League (NBL) combined with the
Basketball Association of America (BAA).99 In 1954, Boston Celtics star Bob
Cousy attempted to organize NBA players, becoming the first president of the
National Basketball Players Association (NBPA). 1° ° At that time, the NBA had
no minimum wage, no health benefits, no pension plan, no per diem, and the aver-
age player salary was $8,000.1'0 From 1957-58, the NBA first began to enter into
discussions with the NBPA. 0 2 But it was not until 1964, when the players threat-
ened to strike for the first televised NBA All-Star game, that the NBA recognized
88. Id.
89. Id. Grievances involving more than one Club or a player not under contract can be filed to begin
at this stage. Id.
90. Id. Note that there are also special procedures for grievances necessitating a medical expert. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (The Rules are contained in Appendix A of the Agreement).
94. Id. app. A, §§ 3 & 6.
95. Id. app. A, § 8.
96. Id.
97. Id. app. A, § 13.
98. Id. art. XI, § B.
99. NBA.com: Powerful Lakers Repeat, http://www.nba.com/history/season/l19491950.html (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008).
100. NBA Player's Association: NBPA History, http://nbpa.comlhistory.php (last visited Mar. 3,
2008).
101. Id.
102. Id. These discussions could not be termed "negotiations," as the NBA had not yet recognized
the NBPA as the voice of the players.
[Vol. 2008
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the NBPA as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the players. 103
Negotiations, and the CBA that followed, resulted in the players receiving an eight
dollar per diem and a pension plan (albeit funded in part by the players them-
selves). 1°4 "In 1976, the NBA and NBPA entered into a... settlement agreement
which [changed] a number of ... operation[s in] the NBA, including a modifica-
tion of the college draft and [the] institution of the right of first refusal." 10 5 This
agreement was know as the Robertson Settlement Agreement (RSA) and was set
to expire at the end of the 1986-87 season. 1° 6 The RSA eliminated the "reserve"
or "option" clauses that, like those clauses that were common in the old days of
the MLB, would bind a player to his team after his contract had expired. 0 7 Con-
current with the adoption of the RSA, the NBA and NBPA entered into a multi-
year CBA, which incorporated the substantive terms of the RSA and would be in
effect until 1979.108 In 1980, the parties sought to preserve the status quo, and
"executed a two-year CBA expressly incorporating the terms of the RSA.' '1°9 In
1983, many NBA teams were experiencing financial difficulty, both spending and
losing a lot of money."l 0 As a result, the NBPA and the Commissioner decided to
implement a salary cap in order to create a salary structure capable of accommo-
dating the interests of both sides."' The cap was to be the first of any kind seen in
professional sports, and the decision was predictably met with huge opposition
from the players." 2 Though the players challenged the cap in court, 113 they ulti-
mately "yielded to financial pressure and agreed to institute [a] salary cap to re-
store the league's financial health."' 1 4 The salary cap that was ultimately ap-
proved by the players in 1983 called for a sharing of league revenues, appropriat-
ing 53% to the players.' 15 The salary cap also limited the amount of compensation
that teams could offer new players, regardless of whether the new player was a
free agent or a rookie." 6 Additionally, the salary cap provided for a minimum
total team payroll and a predetermined cap for rookie salaries. 17 Along with the
salary cap, the 1983 agreement included the "Larry Bird Exception." 118 The Larry
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Michelle Hertz, The National Basketball Association and the National Basketball Players Asso-
ciation Opt to Cap Off the 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement with a Full Court Press: In re Chris
Dudley, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 251, 252 (1995).
106. Id. The agreement was named the "Robertson Settlement Agreement" after Oscar Robertson.
Robertson was the president of the NBPA until 1974, and the agreement came after a class action
lawsuit instituted by the players challenging some of the League's actions as violative of antitrust laws.
See id.; National Basketball Players Association: NBPA History, supra note 100 (in the 1964 and 1970
sections).
107. National Basketball Players Association: NBPA History, supra note 100.
108. See Hertz, supra note 105, at 252-53.
109. Id. at 253.
110. See Melanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap
Systems, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 218 (2003).
111. Id. at 218-19.
112. Id. at 220-21.
113. Id. at 253 (citing Lanier v. NBA, 82 Civ. 4935 (S.D.N.Y.)).
114. See Hertz, supra note 105, at 253.
115. NBPA History, supra note 100.
116. See Aubut, supra note 110, at 219.
117. Id. See infra footnotes 139-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of rookie contracts.
118. Aubut, supra note 110, at 219.
No. 1]
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Bird exception allows teams to exceed the salary cap when signing free agents in
limited circumstances. 19 Basically, the exception provides teams resigning their
veteran free agents the ability to offer up to 12.5% more of the player's salary per
season, regardless of the salary cap.' 20 The effect of the luxury tax is to limit team
abuse of salary cap exceptions, such as the Larry Bird exception, by doubling the
expense of excess spending and redistributing that penalty amount to those teams
not exceeding the luxury tax threshold. 121 To deter teams from using this excep-
tion to substantially exceed the salary cap, the luxury tax penalty was set to be
100% of any overage.l12
At the end of that season, the players sued the owners once again on anti-trust
grounds. 123 Though the lawsuit was ultimately settled out of court, the 1988 CBA
was a landmark lawsuit for professional sports. 12 4 The 1988 agreement was an
incorporation of the Bridgeman Settlement Agreement which brought the first
unrestricted free agency to any professional sports league, among other player-
favorable provisions, and was set to run through 1994.12 At the expiration of that
agreement, the players again unsuccessfully sought relief in the courts, again chal-
lenging the salary cap, the college draft, and the right of first refusal. 126 However,
the parties entered into a no-lockout, no-strike agreement which effectively ex-
tended the CBA through the end of the 1994-95 season. 127 After a short lock-out
in 1995, the NBPA and NBA agreed to a new CBA that was in effect until
1281998. In 1998, the NBA exercised its option to terminate the 1995 agreement
and attempted to roll back salaries and institute a hard salary cap. 12  The NBPA
refused to submit to these demands, resulting in the longest lockout and work
stoppage in NBA history. 30 The two sides finally reached an accord, and in 1999
a new six-year CBA was reached. 131 The latest CBA was reached in July 2005
and will remain in effect until the end of the 2010-2011 season.
132
As previously stated, the NBA was the first professional sports league to es-
tablish a salary cap. The current NBA CBA defines the term "salary cap" as the
"maximum allowable Team Salary for each Team for a Salary Cap Year," and this
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Larry Coon, NBA Salary Cap FAQ, http://members.cox.net/imcoon/salarycap.htm#16
(last visited Mar. 1, 2008) and 1999 NBA/NBPA CBA art. VH, §5(a)). Note that the application of the
Larry Bird exception has several subtle yet complex variations that are outside the scope of this article.
For a thorough explanation of this exception, see Larry Coon, NBA Salary Cap FAQ,
http://members.cox.net/lmcoon/salarycap.htm# 16 (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
121. See Aubut, supra note 110, at 219-20.
122. Id. at 220.
123. NBPA History, supra note 100 (Under the 1987-88 section).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (Under the 1994 section).
127. Id. This agreement was made to ensure the 1994-95 season would be played in its entirety. Id.
128. Id. (Under the 1995 section).
129. Id. (Under the 1997-98 section).
130. Id. The lockout extended from late summer of 1998 to January 20, of 1999. Id.
131. Id. The CBA also included an owner option to extend to a seventh season, which was exercised
for 2004-05. Id.
132. 2005 NBA Player's Association Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XXXIX, § 1, available at
http://www.nbpa.comlcba-articles.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) [hereinafter 2005 NBA CBA].
Again, the owners have the option of extending the CBA by one year to include the 2011-12 season.
Id. art. XXXIX, § 2.
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amount is determined each year as a percentage of projected operating reve-
nues. 133 The current salary cap provides for a 51% share of revenues, calculated
as a percentage of projected Basketball Related Income (BRI) for the current sala-
ry cap year, minus projected benefits, divided by the number of teams scheduled
to play in the NBA during the salary cap year. 134 The CBA also mandates a yearly, 135
minimum team salary, which is calculated as 75% of that year's salary cap. In
addition to the salary cap and minimum salary limitations, there is also a luxury
tax that mandates a dollar-for-dollar penalty tax for any team spending over the
"Tax Level," which is also defined in the CBA.136 This amount differs from the
amount listed as the salary cap because the NBA has what is referred to as a "soft"
salary cap, meaning that there are exceptions that allow a team to exceed the cap.
For example, the NBA salary cap for 2006-07 was $53.135 million, while the tax
level was not breached until teams passed the $65.42 million spending mark.' 37
Therefore, teams could spend in excess of $12 million over the stated salary cap
before they would be taxed, provided their spending fell within an approved ex-
ception, most notably the Larry Bird exception.
138
While the free agency systems of the NBA and MLB are similar, the NBA's
system differs from MLB in several respects. While it is easiest to think of unre-
stricted free agency as the rule and restricted free agency as the exception, the
restricted form plays a major role in the NBA. Understanding restricted free
agency begins with determining whether a rookie player was signed to a "Rookie
Scale Contract" or a "regular contract."' 39 Rookie Scale Contracts are for those
players who are drafted in the first round of the NBA Amateur draft. 140 These
"rookies" are slotted into predetermined contract amount scale (determined by
each player's draft position) and are signed to two-year contracts that give the
signing team an option to renew for a third and fourth year.' 4' These rookie play-
ers become unrestricted free agents after their third season if the team does not
choose to exercise the option for the fourth season.142 If the team does choose to
exercise the option for the fourth year, the team may then make what is termed a
"qualifying offer" for the player's service for a new contract. By making a quali-
fying offer, the player becomes a restricted free agent, and his current team has the
right of first refusal on competing offers. 143 This offer is a one-year proposition,
133. Id. art. I, §§§ ggg, hhh, mmn. A salary cap year begins July 1 and ends the following June 30.
Id. art. L § hhh.
134. Id. art. VII, § 2(a)(1). "Basketball Related Income" means the aggregate operating revenues
received by the NBA or any of its subsidiaries during the salary cap year. Id. art. VII, § 1 (a).
135. Id. art. VII, § 2(b)(1).
136. Id. art. VII, §§ 12(a)(17) & (f).
137. NBA News, http://www.nba.com/news/NBA-salarycap-06071 l.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
138. See Aubut, supra note 110, at 219-20. The Larry Bird exception is termed the "Veteran Free
Agent Exception" in the CBA. Other exceptions include the "Existing Contracts Exception," the
"Disabled Player Exception," the "Bi-Annual Exception," the "Mid-level Salary Exception," the
"Rookie Exception," the "Minimum Player Salary Exception," and the 'Traded Player Exception."
See 2005 NBA CBA art. VIL § 6.
139. 2005 NBA CBA art. VII, § 1.
140. Id.
141. Id. art. VIII, § 1(a).
142. Id. art. XI, § 4(a)(i).
143. Id. art. XI, § 5(a). Other than the specific provisions for Rookie Scale Contracts, the rest of the
restricted free agency rule apply to all veteran free agents with three or fewer years of NBA service.
Id. art. XI, § 4(b).
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and if accepted, will allow the player to become an unrestricted free agent after
that year of service. 144 If another team wishes to sign that player for a higher
amount than what his current team has offered as its qualifying offer, they will
submit an offer sheet that provides terms for a contract lasting for at least two
years. If the player wants to accept the offer from the other team, he would sign
the offer sheet, and his current team then would have seven days to match the
offer and keep the player. 145 If that team fails to do so, the player is deemed to
have automatically entered a contract with the new team at the offered rate.
146
Likewise, if the current team chooses to exercise its right of first refusal and
match the offer, the exercise of that right binds the player and the team to a new
contract at the offered terms. 147 Additionally, if the player's current team submits
what is termed a "Maximum Qualifying Offer," it must be for a minimum of six-
years and all guaranteed compensation. 14 8 Maximum qualifying offers are based
on the provision restricting the maximum annual salary a player may receive,
which is defined as a certain percentage of the total salary cap of each team.1
49
Thus, a maximum qualifying offer states the player's first year salary as the max-
imum annual salary for players with his years of service, with 10.5% increases per
year for the rest of the contract. 150 This offer puts other teams who would consid-
er exceeding this maximum contract offer in a difficult position, because unlike
the player's current team, new teams would not qualify for a salary cap exception
with respect to that player and thus all of the money offered would count against
the salary cap.151 Finally, unlike the MLB, there is no compensation for teams
whose free agents sign with new teams.
52
Like Major League Baseball, the NBA also employs an arbitration procedure
for settling grievances, as well as a system arbitrator to settle any and all disputes
relating to the specific articles of the CBA.153 The NBA grants a "Grievance Ar-
bitrator" the exclusive jurisdiction to settle "all disputes involving the interpreta-
tion or application of, or compliance with, the provisions of (the CBA] or the pro-
visions of a Player Contract, including a dispute concerning the validity of a Play-
er Contract."' 54 The grievance arbitrator also has jurisdiction to settle disputes
relating to the various trusts created by the NBA and NBPA for the benefit of the
players. 155 The grievance arbitrator is appointed by joint agreement of the NBA
144. Coon, supra note 120 (number 36). If the qualifying offer is neither accepted nor withdrawn and
the time for accepting it passes, the current team's right of first refusal continues. 2005 NBA CBA art.
XI, § 4(c)(ii).




149. Id. See also 2005 NBA CBA art. II, § 7 (defining the maximum annual salary). Note that the
maximum annual salary is also dependent on how many years the player has been in the NBA.
150. 2005 NBA CBA art. X1, § 4(a)(ii)(B).
151. See id.; Coon, supra note 120 (number 19).
152. Id. art. XI, § 1.
153. Id. art. XXXI-XXXII.
154. Id. art XXXI, § l(a)(i). Any dispute involving the provisions CBA or player contracts are de-
fined in this section as a "grievance." Id.
155. Id. art. XXXL § l(a)(ii). These trusts include the National Basketball Association Supplemental
Benefit Plan and the Agreement and Declaration of Trust Establishing the National Basketball Players




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2008, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2008/iss1/12
Beyond the Box Score
and the NBPA, as is any successor grievance arbitrator that may be necessary due
to the discharge or resignation of the original arbitrator. 156 The process used for
grievance arbitration may be initiated by a player, a team, the NBA, or the players
association. 157 Before the process may be initiated, the party with the grievance
must first discuss the matter with the opposing party in an attempt to settle. 158 The
grievance must then be initiated within thirty days of the occurrence upon which
the grievance is based (or within thirty days of when the party initiating the griev-
ance first learns of the facts of the matter, whichever is later). 159 The party initiat-
ing the grievance then files notice with the opposing party that they are initiating a
grievance. 16° Upon at least thirty days of written notice to the other party, the
NBA and NBPA may schedule a hearing on a date that is convenient to all the
parties of the dispute.16' The parties then submit, no later than seven days prior to
the hearing, a "joint statement of the issue(s) of the dispute."'162 Then, "no[] later
than three (3) business days prior to the hearing, the parties shall exchange witness
lists, relevant documents and other evidentiary materials, [as well as] citations of
legal authority that each side intends to rely on [at the hearing]. '163 The arbitrator
may also allow any party wishing to file a pre- or post-hearing brief to do so at
least three business days before the hearing, unless an opposing party can show
that it is unreasonable under the circumstances. '64 All hearings are then "con-
ducted in accordance with the Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association," as long as those rules do not conflict with the provisions of the
CBA.165 Following the hearing, the arbitrator is instructed to render a decision as
156. Id. art. XXXI, § 6. The grievance arbitrator is set to serve for the duration of the CBA, although
he may resign or be discharged by either the NBA or NBPA upon notice to the arbitrator and the other
party. Id. In the event of a notice of discharge, the arbitrator maintains jurisdiction to settle disputes
for which a date has been set or are filed in the thirty days preceding the notice of discharge. Id.
157. Id. art. XXXI, § 2(a).
158. Id. art. XXXI, § 2(b).
159. Id. art. XXXI, § 2(c).
160. Id. art. XXXI, § 2(d):
(i) a player or the Players Association may initiate a Grievance (A) against the NBA by filing
written notice... with the NBA, and (B) against a Team, by filing written notice ... with the
Team and the NBA; (ii) a team may initiate a Grievance by filing written notice ... with the
Players Association and furnishing copies of [the] notice to the player(s) involved and to the
NBA; and (iii) the NBA may initiate a Grievance by filing written notice... with the Players As-
sociation and fumishing copies of [the] notice to the player(s) and teams involved.
Id.
161. Id. art. XXXI, § 3(a). Once a hearing is scheduled, neither the NBA nor NBPA may postpone it
more than once. Id. art. XXX, § 3(d). In the event that a hearing is postponed, the party seeking the
postponement pays the arbitrator's postponement fee. Id. art. XXX, § 3(c). However, if the opposing
party objects to the postponement and the arbitrator finds the request was for good cause, the parties
then share the postponement fee. Id.
162. Id. art. XXXI, § 4(a). If the parties cannot agree on a joint statement, each party may issue a
separate statement that is given to the opposing party at the same time as it is given to the grievance
arbitrator. Id.
163. Id. art. XXXI, § 4(c). Unless the proffering party has good cause, the parties may not rely on
any material or witnesses not identified and given to the opposing party in advance of the hearing to
prove its case. Id.
164. Id. art. XXXI, § 4(d).
165. Id. art. XXXI, § 3(g). Additionally, the arbitrator has jurisdiction and authority only to go so far
in resolving disputes, including the ability to: "(i) interpret, apply, or determine compliance with the
provisions of [the CBA]; (ii) interpret, apply or determine compliance with the provisions of Player
Contracts; (iii) determine the validity of Player Contracts; (iv) award damages; (v) award declaratory
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soon as possible.1 66 The decision is to be accompanied by a written opinion, or if
both the NBA and NBPA agree, a written opinion may follow soon after the deci-
sion. 1 67 The arbitrator's decision is considered the full and final disposition, bind-
ing all the parties to the matter.'
68
In addition to "grievance arbitration," the NBA also has what is termed "sys-
tem arbitration."' 169 The NBA uses system arbitration to resolve disputes arising
out of the CBA provisions relating to some of the structural provisions of the CBA
such as the salary cap, minimum team salary, rookie scale contracts, the NBA
draft, free agency, and league expansion. 170 A system arbitrator is selected by the
NBA and NBPA jointly, and serves for continually renewable two-year terms. 17 1
Like grievance arbitration, the parties to a system dispute must first attempt to
settle the matter prior to initiating arbitration proceedings. 172  However, unlike
grievance arbitration, system arbitration may only be initiated by the NBA or
NBPA, and the initiation must be started within three years of the date of the act
upon which the system arbitration is based, rather than the thirty-day deadline for
grievances. 173 The party initiating the arbitration then provides notice to both the
system arbitrator and the opposing party, after which time a hearing may be com-
menced in as soon as seventy-two hours.' 74 Upon notice of arbitration, the arbitra-
tor has the authority to order the production of documents, conduct pre-hearing
dispositions, and compel the attendance of witnesses to the extent necessary to
make findings of fact and issue a decision. 175 As in grievance arbitration, the
arbitrator then issues a decision, which may be accompanied by a full written
opinion of the grounds upon which the decision is based. 176 This decision is typi-
cally the final resolution of the matter, though system arbitration does include the
availability of an appeal process in most cases. 177 Appeals are heard before a
three-member panel chosen jointly by the NBPA and the NBA. 178 A party seek-
ing to appeal the decision of a system arbitrator must serve upon the other party
and file with the system arbitrator notice of appeal within ten days of the decision
appealed. 79 This service and filing of notice of appeal automatically stays the
system arbitrator's decision pending the outcome of the appeal. 180 The appeal
process begins with the parties setting a briefing schedule,' 8' after which time
each party has between fifteen and twenty-five days to serve the brief to the op-
relief .. " Id. art. XXXL § 5(b). However, he may only decide questions of procedural arbitrability,
and he may not modify terms of the CBA or any player contract. Id.
166. Id art. XXXI, § 5(a).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. art. XXXII.
170. Id. art. XXXII, § 1.
171. Id. art. XXXII, §§ 6(a)-(b).
172. Id. art. XXXII, § 2(b).
173. Id. art. XXXII, §§ 2(c)-(d).
174. Id. art. XXXII, §§ 2(d) & 5.
175. Id. art. XXXII, § 3(c).
176. Id. art. XXXII, § 3(b).
177. Id. art. XXXII, § 3(d).
178. Id. art. XXXII, § 7.
179. Id. art. XXXII, § 3(d).
180. Id. art. XXXII, § 8(a).
181. Id. art. XXXIL § 8(b). The schedule may be agreed upon by the NBA and NBPA, or by the
appeals panel if the parties are unable to come to an agreement. Id.
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posing party and file the brief with the appeals panel. 12 The appeals panel then
schedules oral arguments on the parties' briefs between five and ten days after the
filing. 183 The appeals panel then reviews the system arbitrator's findings of fact
and conclusions of law and issues a written decision on the matter within thirty
days of that argument. 84 This decision constitutes the full, final, and complete
resolution of the matter.' 85
IV. NFL: THEN & Now
The National Football League (NFL) has been in existence since 1922,"' al-
though the NFL as we now know it did not exist until the 1966 merger of the
American Football League (AFL) and the existing National Football League
(NFL). 18 7 In 1956, the players of the NFL organized to back a representative
body, the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA).188 At that
time, the players had virtually no bargaining power, and although several propos-
als, such as a minimum salary requirement, were made to the owners, those pro-
posals were likely not even considered. 189 The NFLPA continued to be a fairly
weak organization after the AFL-NFL merger until 1970, when the players first
threatened to strike. 190 Though the players' threat was essentially empty, 19 1 the
NFLPA and the owners soon reached a four-year agreement (the 1968 Agree-
ment) providing for a minimum wage and an improved pension and insurance
plan. 192 The agreement solidified the NFLPA as an established entity and formid-
able bargaining force, and the union then moved for larger concessions. In 1974,
the NFLPA challenged the 1968 Agreement's "Rozelle Rule," which required any
team signing a free agent from another team to compensate that team in the form
of draft picks and players. 193 In Mackey v. National Football League,194 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Rozelle rule violated the Sherman
Act by creating an unreasonable restraint on trade. 19 5 The adverse court ruling
prompted owners to negotiate with the NFLPA, and in 1977 a new CBA was
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. art. XXXII, §§ 8(b)-(c).
185. Id. art. XXXII, § 8(c).
186. NFL - History, 1921-1930, http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1921-1930 (last visited Mar.
2, 2008). This was following a name change from the American Professional Football Association.
Id.
187. NFL - History, 1961-1970, http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1961-1970 (last visited Mar.
2, 2008).
188. NFL Players Association: History, The Beginning-1956,
http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx?fmid=182&lmid=239&pid--O&type=c (last visited Mar.
29, 2008).
189. Id. The representative for the NFLPA was quoted as saying that when he went to New York to
present their proposals, "We never did get a chance to meet with the owners and we never got a re-
sponse from any of the proposals at that time." Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The players were in a weak bargaining position, and after the owners threatened to cancel the
season the strike ended after only two days. Id.
192. Id.
193. Aubut, supra note 110, at 212.
194. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
195. Id. at 623.
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formed. 196 The new CBA included increased benefits, arbitration of grievances,
and reforms of the waiver system and the option clause. 197 In 1987, the players
attempted to negotiate a new CBA that allowed for more meaningful free agency,
but the inability to agree to terms led to a strike season. 198 The owners rendered
the players' strike unsuccessful by employing replacement players and allowing
players to cross the picket line and play under the existing terms, which many
players did.199 Recognizing the situation as futile, the players ended the strike and
filed a lawsuit. 2°° In 1993, after five years of litigation, the NFL reached a settle-
ment that created a new CBA with a new system of free agency, a salary cap, and
a salary floor. 201 The 2006 NFL CBA maintains these provisions and is to remain
in effect through the 2012 season.
2 2
Like the NBA, the NFL has a salary cap and a guaranteed minimum salary
203provision. However, unlike the "soft" salary cap of the NBA, the NFL salary
cap does not allow teams to use exceptions to exceed the cap. Thus, the NFL's
salary cap is termed a "hard" cap, and attempted violations of the cap may be
voided or result in stiff penalties.2  While the current CBA has prescribed actual
dollar figure amounts for the 2006 and 2007 seasons, the balance of the agreement
defines the salary cap in terms of a percentage of the projected total league reve-
nues, minus projected total league benefits, divided by the number of NFL
teams. 205 The agreement, after defining the percentage upon which the cap is
based, allows for future adjustments if the salary cap does not match the agreed
percentage after the season is over and the actual numbers are tallied.2°6 The
agreement also provides an exception if the final numbers substantially deviate
from the projected percentage of profit that the cap is based upon. 207 For instance,
the CBA provides that an adjustment (up or down) will be made to the 2009 cap if
the 2007 total league-wide cash player costs exceed or fall below a triggering
208percentage of the total revenues for that year. This provision ensures that the
cap will not begin to substantially deviate from the bargained-for percentage of
profits that either the players or owners actually receive. The exception/guarantee
provisions in the agreement are an extension of this adjustment formula and exist




198. Aubut, supra note 110, at 212. The right of first refusal and the compensation system limited
player movement. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. See also Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1978).
201. Aubut, supra note 110, at 213.
202. 2006 NFL CBA art. I, § 4(aw), available at
http:llwww.nflplayers.comluser/template.aspx?fmid= 181 &lmid=23 1 &pid=507&type=c (last visited
Apr. 18, 2008) (membership required to access the full CBA).
203. Id. art. XXIV.
204. Id. art. XXV, § 6(a). See also Aubut, supra note 110, at 216 (mentions "hard" salary cap).
205. 2006 NFL CBA art. XXIV, § 4(a). The agreement does provide that the last year of the agree-
ment will be an uncapped year, though the same provision was included in previous CBAs and the
parties have renegotiated or extended the agreements without ever actually going to an uncapped year.
Id.
206. Id. art. XXXII, § 4(b).
207. Id. art. XXIV, § 4(d).
208. Id. art. XXIV, § 4(b)(i).
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to ensure that both the minimum salary guarantees and the cap have been followed
once the actual dollars are received.209 For example, the guaranteed league-wide
salary is set at 50% of total revenues.210 If the final accounting reflects that the
player compensation falls below that amount for a given year, then the teams must
disburse the difference to the players.2 1 A "trigger/bail-out" provision of the
agreement ensures that the minimum guarantee is further complied with, in that if
the percentage of total revenue paid to the players stays at least at 56.074%, then
the salary cap stays in effect for the duration of the agreement. 212 However, if that
amount falls below 46.868% in a given year, then there will be no salary cap for
the league until the amount again breaks the 56.074% mark for a year.213 Without
these provisions, owners could constantly pay the players based on the lowest
projection of league revenues, and then pay whatever difference there was up to
the league-wide minimum every year.
The NFL has a relatively complex system of free agency. The system is best
understood by dividing the free agents into restricted or unrestricted categories,
with sub-categories of "transitional" and "franchise" players.214 Unrestricted free
agents consist of those players whose contracts have expired and have completed
five or more accrued seasons, 215 or four or more accrued seasons in any capped
216year. Such players have the right to negotiate and sign a contract with any team
that the player chooses.2 17 The only caveat to this unrestricted negotiation is that
if the player has not signed with another team by the time NFL training camp
begins or July 22, whichever is later, he may only sign a one-year contract with
his current team with a pay of at least 110% of his prior year salary. 28 The player
then has until the tenth week of the NFL regular season to sign this contract, or he
is prohibited from playing in the NFL that year and will begin the next free agen-
cy period as an unrestricted free agent once again.
Restricted free agents fall into two categories: (1) players with less than three
accrued seasons; and (2) players with at least three but less than five accrued sea-
sons. 22 A player "with less than three Accrued Seasons whose contract has ex-
pired may... sign a Player Contract only with his Prior Club," if that club offers
him a one-year contract on or before the March 1 deadline. 221 If the prior club
makes no such offer, the player then becomes an unrestricted free agent, available
to negotiate and sign with any club.222 A player with at least three but less than
five accrued seasons has the right to sign with any club just as an unrestricted free
209. See generally id. art. XXIV, § 4.
210. Id. art. XXIV, § 3.
211. Id.
212. Id. art. XXIV, § 2(a).
213. Id. art. XXIV, § 2(b).
214. Aubut, supra note 110, at 213.
215. 2006 NFL CBA, art. XIX, § 1(a). An "accrued season" is defined as each season a player was or
should have been on full pay status for at least six or more regular season games. Id. art. XVIII, § 1(a).
216. Id. art. XIX, § 1(a).
217. Id.
218. Id. art. XIX, § l(b)(i).
219. Id. art. XIX, §§ l(b)(ii)-(iii).
220. Id. art. XVIII-XIX.
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223
agent would, but with restrictions. The main restriction includes giving the
prior club a right of first refusal and/or draft choice compensation if that club ten-
ders a qualifying offer on or before the first date of the free agency signing pe-
riod.224 The CBA establishes the minimum qualifying offer that a current club
must make in order to maintain their right of first refusal, though clubs may make
offers in excess of that minimum amount to increase the amount of draft choice
compensation that the team would receive if the player signs with a new team.2
25
For example, if a team makes the minimum qualifying offer to a player who was
originally drafted in the fourth round, and a new team makes a higher offer, the
current team has two options: (1) match the new team's higher offer and keep the
player, or (2) allow the player to sign with the new team and receive a compensa-
tory draft choice from that player's original draft round (in this example, a fourth
round draft pick).226 If the current team's qualifying offer is in excess of the min-
imum allowable qualifying offer, thus placing the offer in a category requiring
additional draft compensation, the cost to the new team for signing what was orig-
inally a fourth round draft choice could be as much as a first and third round draft
choice. 27 However, if the current club chooses not to make a qualifying offer to a
player who would otherwise be a restricted free agent, that player will become an
unrestricted free agent and able to sign with any new team he chooses.228
Two subsets of the NFL free agency system, "franchise" and "transition"
player designations, further restrict player movement. Every year, a team is per-
mitted to choose one player who would otherwise be a free agent to be a "fran-
chise player."229 A team designating a franchise player has the option of two re-
quired tenders that will make the player an "exclusive" or "nonexclusive" fran-
chise player.230 If the team offers the designated franchise player a one-year con-
tract of at least the average of the top five salaries of that player's position as of
the end of the restricted free agent signing period of that year, that player is an
exclusive franchise player.23 1 An exclusive franchise player may not negotiate or
sign a contract with any new club.232 To make a player a nonexclusive franchise
player, a club must only offer a one-year contract of the greater of the average of
the top five salaries of that player's position from the prior year or 120% of the
player's salary from the prior year. If the team makes this designation, the
player may still negotiate and sign a contract with a new team, but the former
team must then be compensated in the form of two first round draft choices.
234
Finally, if a team chooses to designate the same player with the franchise la-
bel for a third time, the required tender for that player is increased to either (1) the
223. Id. art. XIX, § 2(a).
224. Id. art. XIX, §§ 2(b)(i)-(ii). The signing period dates are determined by the league and the play-
er's association every year by September 1st, and the period lasts at least forty-five days. Id. art. XIX,
§ 2(h).
225. Id. art. XIX, §§ 2(b)(i)-(ii).
226. Id. art. XIX, §§ 2(c)(i)-(ii).
227. See id.
228. Id. art. XIX, § 20).
229. Id. art. XX, § 1.
230. Aubut, supra note 110, at 215 (citing 2006 NFL CBA art. XX, §§ 1-2).
231. Id.
232. Id.; 2006 NFL CBA art. XX, § 1.
233. Aubut, supra note 110, at 215; 2006 NFL CBA art. XX, § 2(a)(i).
234. 2006 NFL CBA art. XX, § 2(a)(i).
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average of the highest five salaries for the position with the highest average; (2)
120% of the average of the five highest salaries of the prior year at the player's
position; or (3) 144% of the player's salary of the prior year, whichever is great-
er.235 NFL clubs also have the ability to designate up to two players per year as
"transition" players. 236 Once a club has designated a player as a transition player,
that club is deemed to automatically have offered the player a one-year contract
worth the greater of the average of the highest ten player salaries for the player's
position from the previous year, or 120% of that player's prior year salary.2 7 A
transition player maintains the right to negotiate a contract with any team he
chooses, but his prior team gains the right of first refusal.2 38 And unlike the fran-
chise player designations, if the prior team does not exercise its right of first re-
fusal, that team is not entitled to draft choice compensation. 39
The NFL also has an arbitration system in place for injury 24 and non injury
grievances.2 41 The non-injury grievance procedure is in place for disputes that
relate to the interpretation of, compliance with, and application of the provisions
of the CBA, player contracts, and other rules and bylaws of the league.242 The
process begins when a player, club, the NFL Management Council, or the NFLPA
files a written notice of the grievance with the opposing parties within forty-five
days of the occurrence upon which the grievance is based. The parties to whom
the notice is sent then have a week to answer the complaint by setting forth admis-
sions to or denials of the facts alleged in the grievance. 244 "If the answer denies
,,245the grievance, the specific grounds for denial [must be stated]. If the answer
does not settle the grievance, any of the parties may appeal the grievance by filing
a notice to the Notice Arbitrator and sending notice of appeal to the other parties
involved. 246 The appeals are then scheduled based upon a series of dates available
to four separate arbitrators and are typically heard upon the next available date.
247
"No later than ten (10) days prior to any hearing, each party [must send] to the
,,248
other copies of all documents, reports and records relevant to the dispute.
Failure to do so bars the party from offering that evidence at the hearing, although
the opposing party will still have the opportunity to examine those documents and
use them as it so desires.249 Following this disclosure, the parties have the oppor-
235. Id. art. XX, § 2(b).
236. Id. art. XX, § 3(a).
237. Id. art. XX, § 4(a).
238. Id. art. XX, § 3(b).
239. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 224.
240. Id. art. X, § 1. An "injury grievance" is defined as "a claim or complaint that, at the time a play-
er's NFL Player Contract was terminated by a Club, the player was physically unable to perform the
services required of him by that contract because of an injury incurred in the performance of his ser-
vices under that contract." Id. While this is an important provision of the NFL CBA, especially due to
the physical nature of the sport, the discussion of this process is outside the scope of this article.
241. Id. art. IX.
242. Id. art. IX, § 1.
243. Id. art. IX, § 2.
244. Id. art. IX, § 3.
245. Id.
246. Id. art. IX, § 4.
247. Id. art. IX, §§ 6-7.
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tunity to present all relevant evidence at the hearing-testimony and otherwise.250
After the presentation of evidence, either party may request post-hearing briefs,
which each party will then simultaneously submit.2  The arbitrator must then
"issue a written decision within thirty days of the submission of briefs," or sixty
days of the end of the hearing, whichever is sooner. 252 The arbitrator's decision is
considered the full and final disposition of the dispute, binding all of the parties.
2 53
One caveat to this procedure involves the "grievance settlement committee,"
which consists of the Executive Director of the NFLPA and the Executive Vice
President for Labor Relations of the NFL.25 This committee meets periodically to
discuss pending grievances. If the committee so chooses, they may contact parties
to a grievance and, with the parties' consent, attempt to settle the grievance them-
selves. 255 If the committee is successful, that settlement constitutes the full and
final disposition of the matter.
256
V. ACTUAL CBA EFFECTS ON ON-FIELD COMPETITION VS. PERCEPTION
Comparing the success of different professional sports leagues is a difficult
task. Part of this difficulty stems from the different structures of the leagues-
depending on the sport, regular season games vary from 164 to 16, league man-
dated roster limits range from 12 to 54, the number of playoff teams may be 16 or
8, and the playoff formats may be "sudden death" or best of seven-game series.
The complexity of the comparison task is compounded by the lack of a uniform
opinion on what constitutes success. Are champions more attractive in "Cinderel-
la" or "Dynasty" form? Is the success of a league better measured by its weakest
teams or strongest? The answer to such questions depends on the individual fan,
though a popular opinion seems to be that parity is the goal, and that competitive
balance is the best indicator of success. 257 The NFL is generally viewed as the
model of parity in professional sports, while the MLB has come to represent pro-
fessional sports in its most dynastic form.2 58 This is due to the perception that any
NFL team may become playoff eligible in any given year regardless of their mar-
ket or win-loss record from the prior season, while poor performing MLB teams
are deemed resigned to a perpetual state of mediocrity.25 9
250. Id. art IX, § 7.
251. Id.
252. Id. art IX, § 8.
253. Id.
254. Id. art IX, § 13.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See e.g., Branden Adams, Streaks, Stats, and Minutiae, THE HARvARD INDEPENDENT, Nov. 1,
2007, available at http://www.harvardindependent.com/node/20 (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
258. For example, Major League Baseball has currently has six teams who have not reached the
playoffs in the last ten years, while every team in the NFL has made the playoffs at least once in that
span except for the Houston Texans, who were founded in 2002. See e.g., Pro Football Hall of Fame:
Playoff Results, http://www.profootballhof.comlhistory/release.jsp?RELEASE_.ID=-584 (last visited
Mar. 3, 2008); Major League Baseball: History: Division Series Overview,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/postseason/mlbds.jsp (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
259. See Pro Football Hall of Fame: Playoff Results, supra note 258; Major League Baseball: Histo-
ry: Division Series Overview, supra note 258.
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The question remains whether these perceptions are justified. Considering
the popular adage that only champions are remembered, a closer examination of
each sport is necessary to determine whether a disparity exists in some sports as
opposed to others or if that perception is unfounded. As previously stated, devel-
oping a uniform system of comparison is difficult due to the differences in the
format and schedule of each league. However, one way to determine whether real
competition exists within the various leagues is to examine the chance that any
given team has to achieve a berth in the league's postseason playoff system. In
examining five seasons of professional sports seasons from 2001-2005, the argu-
ment for the NFL system appears to be the most persuasive. In the NFL's 12-
team playoff format, 25 of its current 32 teams (78.1%) became playoff eligible in
the five year period.2 ° Of those teams that participated in the playoffs, only one
was able to accomplish the feat in all five years, while 13 of those teams only
made the playoffs two or fewer times.261 An examination of the NBA's 16-team
playoff format over the same time period reveals that 25 of its 30 teams (83.3%),
262participated in the playoffs. Of those teams, five participated in the playoffs all
263five years, while just eight made the playoffs two or fewer years. And finally,
in the MLB's eight-team playoff system, only 17 of its 30 teams (56.7%) attended
the playoffs from 2001-2005. 264 Two of those teams were in the playoffs in all
five years and nine of those teams played in the playoffs in two or fewer years.
2 65
Over the five sample years the NBA, NFL, and MLB had 80, 60, and 40 playoff
positions available respectively. 266 If the playoff positions occupied by the teams
that made the playoffs in every year are removed, assuming that those teams were
in fact superior to the rest of the teams in their league due to consistent perfor-
mance, 267 then what remains is the pool of playoff slots that the rest of the teams
can realistically hope to obtain. Thus, from 2001-2005 in MLB there were 28
teams (93.3% of the league) competing for 30 (75%) of the playoffs spots. 268 The
NBA had 25 teams (83.3% of the league) competing for 55 (68.8%) playoff spots,
and the NFL had 31 teams (96.9% of the league) competing for 55 (91.7%) of its
260. See NFL Standings: Division (years 2001-2005), www.nfl.com/standings (last visited Mar. 3,
2008).
261. See id.
262. See NBA.com: Season by Season Index, http://www.nba.comlhistory/seasonlindex.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2008); NBA.com: 2001 Playoff Results,
http://www.nba.com/history/playoffs/2000200l.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) (only 2000-2001
through 2002-2003 seasons).
263. See id.
264. See The Official Site of Major League Baseball: Schedule: 2005 Postseason,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/scheduleps.O5.jsp (last visited Mar. 14, 2008); The Official Site of Major
League Baseball: Schedule: 2004 Postseason, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/schedule/ps.04.jsp (last visited
Mar. 14, 2008); The Official Site of Major League Baseball: Standings: Regular Season Standings,
http://mlb.mlb.commlb/standings/index.jsp9ymd=20051002 (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) (2001-2003
seasons).
265. See id.
266. See, e.g., John Clayton, Playoff Format is Matter of Integrity, Dec. 30, 2005
http://proxy.espn.go.com/nfl/columnststory?columnist=clayton-john&id=2275183; NBA.com: The
Playoffs, http://www.nba.com/analysis/00423850.html (last visited on Mar. 3, 2008); Baseball Post-
season Playoffs by Baseball Almanac, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/ws/postseason.shtml (last
visited on Mar. 3, 2008).
267. This may assume too much, but it is for argument's sake.
268. The Official Site of Major League Baseball: Standings, supra note 264.
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playoff spots. 269 These numbers suggest that the playoff races are more consis-
tently "open" in the NFL than in the NBA or MLB.
The percentages for the NBA and MLB are actually almost equal, even taking
into consideration the fact that the MLB's playoff system is half the size of the
NBA. So then why is the NBA system generally accepted and the MLB system
shrouded in controversy? One explanation may simply be the perception that
meaningful competition is impossible with the rising salaries of professional ath-
letes without a salary cap or significant restrictions on free agency. The concept
that revenue sharing in the MLB would help level the playing field took a signifi-
cant hit in 2000 when it was reported that the lower-payroll, small-market clubs
were using the money that they were receiving as part of revenue sharing to turn a
profit, rather than to increase payroll, as it was designed to do. 270 Also, the base-
ball system of arbitration is not nearly as effective at restraining player movement
as the other systems of free agency. This is due in part to the fact that the finan-
cial position of each club cannot be taken into account when reaching an arbitral
award, thus the salaries of the players on small-market teams are measured against
the salaries of the highest paying big-market clubs.271 Because each club's partic-
ular financial position is not considered, the placement of all players is determined
by a market value that is based upon an inflated market that only exists for teams
with the highest revenues and highest payrolls. The result is that owners (espe-
cially those from smaller markets) must either grant significant pay raises to the
player contemplating arbitration or bid considerably more than they would other-
wise be willing to pay in order to have a realistic chance of winning should a mat-
ter proceed to arbitration. For example, one study of arbitration results showed
that although owners succeeded in most arbitration proceedings, the average sala-
ry of players invoking the arbitration process increased at a rate of 95% !272 While
the study takes into account a large number of players who reached a settlement
prior to an arbitrator issuing a final decision,273 it nonetheless illustrates the notion
that arbitration is a win-win situation for the players. However, the result of the
arbitration process for many of the smaller market teams is that these teams are
either "priced-out" of retaining players or forced to reduce salary in other areas of
their rosters in order to keep the arbitrating players on staff. Thus, for some
teams, the arbitration system actually forces player movement instead of restrain-
ing it. The best players (or at least the most valuable based on the criteria consi-
dered during salary arbitration) are therefore shuttled to the teams that can afford
to pay their salaries, a continuous cycle that effectively ruins any attempt at equal-
ity amongst all teams in the league.
Meanwhile, the NBA seems fortunate that either the number of teams in its
playoff system or a relative lack of knowledge by the average fan hides the flaw in
its "soft" cap. One Larry Bird exception in the NBA is the free agency equivalent
269. See NFL History, http://www.nfl.com/history (last visited Mar. 3, 2008); NBA.com: History,
http://www.nba.com/history/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
270. See Richard C. Levin et al., The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner's Blue
Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics (2000), available at
http:www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blueribbon.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
271. See 2007-2011 MLB Basic Agreement art. VL § F(12)(b)(i), available at
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2008) (MLB CBA).
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of allowing an NFL team to designate five franchise players, but without salary
cap consequences. Considering that only five players are playing for an NBA
team at any one time, this exception can swallow the salary cap-rule for teams that
strike it rich in the draft. The Larry Bird exception was a major point of contro-
versy in the 1998 lockout just as it was during settlement discussions prior to the
1995 CBA agreement, but the exception has survived negotiations again and again
and so is not likely to be deleted anytime soon. 275 The problem is that the effects
of the exception could subject the NBA to issues similar to those that exist in Ma-
jor League Baseball. Considering that wealthier NBA clubs can afford to pay not
only the extremely high salaries for star players regardless of the salary cap, but
also the contracts of star rookies, the Larry Bird exception limits competition by
discouraging player movement. 276 The question, then, is whether the NBA "soft
cap" is actually any more effective at maintaining competitive balance than no cap
at all. The playoff numbers indicate that the NBA's soft cap has little effect on
maintaining competitive balance, and thus suggest the answer to the question is
"no." There remains a real chance in the NBA that a team with good fortune in its
choice of draft picks could conceivably lock-in a serious competitive advantage
for years and years with skillful use of the salary cap exceptions.277 This situation
essentially existed for the Chicago Bulls in the 1990s when that team won six
championships in eight years (using the Larry Bird exception for star Michael
Jordan during that period), and they could have been even more dominant had
Jordan not elected to play baseball instead of basketball for a year and a half in the
mid-90s.278 If such a circumstance comes to fruition again, critics of the soft cap
demanding to be heard will have many fans listening to their howl.
VI. SOLVING EXISTING PROBLEMS OF COMPETITION AND PERCEPTION IN
THE NBA AND MLB
Major League Baseball seems to be the most criticized of the leagues, due in
part to the fact that the same teams seem to reach the playoffs every year, while
"dark horse" champions are few and far between. 279 For example, the New York
Yankees, perennially the team with one of, if not the, highest salaried rosters in
baseball, have won twenty-six total championships. 280 That number is more than
the total of sixteen other clubs combined. 28' The cause of this imbalance is
clear-smaller market teams are priced out of high quality talent and this results
in playoff races that are largely predictable even before the regular seasons have
started. To deflect some of this criticism and as a potential solution, the MLB
274. This is based on the number of players allowed in each league's active roster.
275. See Aubut, supra note 110, at 235.
276. See id. at 234.
277. See id. at 235.
278. See NBA.com: NBA Finals: All-Time Champions,
http://www.nba.com/history/finals/chamnpions.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008); NBA.com: Michael
Jordan Career Perspective, http://www.nba.com/jordan/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
279. See The Official Site of Major League Baseball: World Series Overview,
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could expand its playoff format to twelve teams and thus allow for more meaning-
ful competition towards the lower revenue clubs. An increased number of playoff
teams should also renew interest in the baseball season for those fans whose teams
have been consistently eliminated from playoff contention long before season's
end. Additionally, adding playoff teams may have the ancillary benefit of slowing
the inflation of player salaries, as teams would not be willing or required to pay as
much in order to load a roster with high-priced talent and have a legitimate chance
of reaching the playoffs.
Another possible change that could help with competitive balance includes al-
tering the arbitration process from the "final offer" format to the traditional system
in which an arbitrator could choose a figure between the offers given by the play-
ers and teams. Studies of the arbitration system in MLB have shown that the dis-
parities between player and team offers have grown fairly steadily since the arbi-
tration system was put in place. 282 The current system of arbitration places a great
amount of pressure on teams to settle before an arbitrator renders a decision that
may force the team to pay the higher amount proposed by the player. The player,
meanwhile, may rely on free agency to eventually deliver the payoff he hopes to
receive during arbitration so that he has less of an incentive to have his offer
represent his actual market value. The original idea of "final offer" arbitration
was that the risk of the either/or decision would serve to keep offers by both sides
reasonably close, 283 but it appears that the prospect of free agency is wearing
down that rationale. While a change to the traditional system would undoubtedly
lead to less settlements, it would be replaced by the discretion of the arbitrator and
prevent skyrocketing salaries by decreasing the risk to teams that a reasonably low
offer could be shunned in favor of an unreasonably high one. This transition
would also be convenient for the league, as MLB already has a system in place for
grievance arbitration that could be easily transferred over to be used in salary
arbitration. Additionally, a change from the current procedure to one in which the
arbitrator issues a written opinion would be valuable to both clubs and players,
due to the fact that each would have a better understanding (via the impartial arbi-
trator's perspective) of how each evaluated criteria contributes to the estimation of
a player's market value, thus making the approach to contract negotiations and
arbitration more consistent.
Another possible solution that would involve a drastic change in the structure
of Major League Baseball would be to eliminate free agency altogether. The sala-
ry arbitration system would be modified to permit consideration of other player
salaries in other sports, thereby restricting the owners' ability to collude and def-
late player salaries, while at the same time allowing smaller market teams to retain
marquee players without the cloud of free agency hanging over the process. It has
been widely recognized that the combination of salary arbitration and free agency
have become inextricably intertwined and nightmarish to owners ever since free
agency was allowed in the sport,284 giving virtually all of the bargaining power to
the players. Removal of the free agency system and modifying the arbitration
process could better equalize the bargaining power.
282. See Conti, supra note 7, at 233-34.
283. Id. at 230.
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The NBA has a similar competition problem brewing, though it has not fully
come to fruition as it has in Major League Baseball. The easiest answer for the
NBA is the one that has eluded owners during every lockout/strike in recent histo-
ry-a switch to a hard salary cap. The players are understandably adamant
against a hard salary cap as the elimination of salary cap exceptions would prevent
many of the players from receiving the most lucrative contracts. 2 5 The Larry
Bird exception, while effective at limiting player movement, is the most obvious
culprit in preventing a steady competitive balance. Elimination of this and other
exceptions to the cap would force player salaries down by providing an absolute
bar for contracts at the most extremely high levels, but this is not necessarily a bad
thing, even for the players involved. Increased parity and competition among
teams in the NBA should make for a more spectator-friendly product, and if the
salary cap remains as a percentage of league revenues, 286 then the players will
receive the benefit of the increase in merchandising, television rights, and ticket
sales along with team owners. While this sort of a change does not appear to be
immediately on the horizon, the soft cap will continue to pose a danger to the
integrity of the competition in the NBA. While neither the NBA or MLB needs to
precisely follow the path of the NFL to continue to be successful, those leagues
continue to be perceived as having some serious flaws in their operation and
should consider changes to their CBAs to better ensure that their systems to main-
tain real competition do not become broken past the point of repair.
Vii. CONCLUSION
The historical progression of the NBA, MLB, and NFL have created entities
whose modes of operation, as defined in their respective collective bargaining
agreements, make each distinct but popular among sports fans. While each league
has undergone its own series problems and renovations, the results have thus far
been exciting and successful. The activities of the several sports leagues are mo-
nitored and discussed long after each season's end, and while the arguments over
some aspects of the leagues sometimes drown out the cheers, it is generally agreed
that business is good.28 Both the NFL and MLB have recently signed enormous
television contracts, 288 and the average NBA team is worth 6% more than it was a
year ago.289  Additionally the NFL's "Super Bowl" was recently named the
"World's Most Valuable Sporting Event Brand" by Forbes, based on "television
rights fees . . . sponsorship revenue from signage inside the stadium, ticket re-
ceipts and licensing revenue." 290 The Super Bowl's value is estimated at $379
285. See Aubut, supra note 110, at 235.
286. See supra Section III.




289. See Kurt Badenhausen et al., The Business of Basketball, Dec. 6, 2006,
http:llwww.forbes.com/2007/12/06/nba-team-valuations-biz-O7nba-czkb-mo-cs-1206nba-land.html.
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million, higher than the total of the next three highest sporting events combined. 9
To be fair, the report does divide the revenue amount by the number of days in the
competition, and concedes that next year's Summer Olympics will be the highest
grossing single event by bringing in excess of $3 billion.292 This factor would also
help to explain why MLB's World Series and the NBA's Finals are considerably
farther down on the list but still respectable at 9th and 10h, respectively.
Despite the success of various professional sports, a balancing act is constant-
ly performed to account for the interests of players and owners alike that can be
profitable to both and enjoyed by fans. With both sides always jockeying for the
best financial position, it seems that as soon as a potential disaster is avoided in
one sport by way of a new collective bargaining agreement, another sport is fu-
riously negotiating to avoid a ruinous strike or lockout. Throughout most of pro-
fessional sports history, collective bargaining has done a brilliant job of calculat-
ing the interests of teams, players, and fans, and carrying the sports forward to
successful, profitable ends. "Soft" cap or "hard" cap, free agency or arbitration,
professional sports continue to represent one of the most popular forms of enter-
tainment and most passionate outlets for fans across the country and around the
world. Meanwhile, the struggle to maintain competitive balance continues, and
the face of sports continues to evolve with each new CBA.
RYAN T. DRYER
291. See id. The next three highest valued sporting events are, in order: the Summer Olympics, the
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